Rothbart and Taylor (1992) propose that some categories of things, “natural kind” categories, are viewed by humans as having an essence, while other categories of things, “human artifact” categories, are not. According to this concept of psychological essentialism, people view natural kinds as possessing underlying unique essences that are specific to the category and as being immutable (e.g., a skunk cannot be changed into a raccoon). By contrast, human artifact categories are seen as mutable and not having an underlying nature (e.g., a chair can be changed into a bird feeder). Important for our argument, Rothbart and Taylor (1992) argue that people tend to view social categories, such as race and gender, as natural kinds and that a perceived genetic underpinning further increases the tendency to view a social category in essential terms. Hoffman and Hurst (1990) and Martin and Parker (1995) provide supporting evidence.
